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Notes
Invisibly Radiated: Federalism
Principles and the Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments
BYKHoI D. NGUYEN*

The United States and 47 other countries are steeped in the
negotiation of a treaty that will ensure that judgments issued by
courts in one member country are enforced by other member
countries.! This proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Hague
Convention) will govern the recognition and enforcement of
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2001. B.S.,
University of California, Berkeley, 1997. I would like to thank Professor Richard Marcus
for his continuing guidance and patience. All errors remain my own.
1. See generallyProposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in
Civil
and
Commercial
Matters
(visited
Mar.
18,
2001)
<http://www.hcch.netle/workprog/jdgm.html>. This is a multilateral treaty on jurisdiction
and judgments under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The Hague Conference is a multilateral organization with 48 member states founded in
1893 to serve as a negotiating forum for civil and commercial legal matters; the United
States joined in 1964. See Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates Its 100th

Anniversary, 28 ThX. INT'L L. J. 531 (1993). A complete list of the members of the Hague
Conference is available on the Hague Conference on Private International Law website.
See

Member

States

(visited

Mar.

18,

2001)

<http:lwww.hcch.netle/members/members.html>.
For the history of this endeavor, see Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague
Conference on Private InternationalLaw to Preparea Convention on Jurisdictionand the
Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J.

INT'L L. 7 (1998).
The latest revisions were made during a meeting held at The Hague from October
25-30, 1999. See FutureHague Convention on InternationalJurisdictionand the Effects of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (visited Mar. 18, 2001)

<http://www.hcch.netle/workprogljdgm.html>.
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jurisdictionally sufficient foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters among contracting states. All future members to the Hague
Convention will be required to recognize and enforce judgments
rendered on approved bases of jurisdiction.2 Likewise, judgments
3
rendered on prohibited grounds of jurisdiction are not enforceable.
The October 1999 preliminary draft Convention will be finalized at
two sessions of the Diplomatic Conference - the first to be held in
June 2001 and the second at either the end of 2001 or the beginning of
2002.' It is expected that the United States, which initiated the
negotiation of this treaty in 1992, 5 would sign and ratify the treaty.
This note focuses on the Hague Convention's prohibition of
contracting state courts' exercise of jurisdiction based solely on
transient jurisdiction and "doing business" general jurisdiction.
Article 18 of the Hague Convention Draft, entitled "Prohibited
grounds of jurisdiction," states:
2. In particular, jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the courts
of a Contracting State on the basis solely of one or more of the
following e) the carrying on of commercial or other activities by the
defendant in that State, except where the dispute is directly
related to those activities;
f) the service of a writ upon the defendant in that State;
6

Transient jurisdiction gives the forum state the power to adjudicate a
claim against a defendant who is served with process within the state's
territorial limits even though the claim is wholly unrelated to the

2. See generally PreliminaryDraft Convention on JurisdictionandForeign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, October 30, 1999 (visited Mar. 18, 2001)
<http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html> [hereinafter Convention Draft].
3. See Convention Draft, supra note 2, art. 26 (stating that "[a] judgment based on a
ground of jurisdiction.., whose application is prohibited by virtue of Article 18
[prohibited grounds of jurisdiction], shall not be recognised or enforced.").
4. See Future Hague Convention, supranote 1.
5. In a letter dated May 5, 1992, Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor of the U.S.
Department of State wrote to Georges Droz, Secretary General of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law proposing that the Hague Conference draft a new
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments. See
Eric B. Fastiff, Note, The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynolds's
Jurisdictionand Enforcement Problems, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 469, 470 n.1 (1995) citing

Hague Conference Doc. No. L.c. ON No 15 (92).
6. See Convention Draft, supra note 2, art. 18, § 2.
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temporary

presence. 7

"Doing

business"

general

jurisdiction (hereinafter "doing business") permits the forum state to
decide a claim against the defendant based on the defendant's
extensively continuous and systematic business activities in that state
even if the claim has no relation to those activities

These proposed prohibited grounds for jurisdiction are currently
accepted in the United States.

The Supreme Court unanimously

upheld the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction in Burnham v.
Superior Court.9 Similarly, in Perkins v. Benguet ConsolidatedMining
Co., the Court held that a non-domiciliary defendant that conducts
nearly all its activities in the forum may be subjected to "doing
business" jurisdiction there.
Therefore, to give effect to the Hague Convention Congress

would need to pass enabling legislation proscribing transient and
"doing business" jurisdiction in both federal and state courts, at least
in cases involving foreign parties from signatory countries.1 While
Congress certainly has the authority to determine the jurisdiction of
federal courts under Article III of the Constitution,12 it would need to
base such legislation on some enumerated power to do the same to
state courts.
This note examines whether there is constitutional authority for
Congress to pass enabling legislation proscribing state courts' use of
these traditional bases of jurisdiction. It concludes that a treaty
proscribing certain bases of state-court jurisdiction cannot trump
7. See ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL
§ 2-4, at 122-23 (3d ed. 1998).
8. See id. § 2-5, at 140-41.
9. 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident who had been
served with process while visiting the state).
10. 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (upholding jurisdiction in an Ohio state-court suit against a
Philippine corporation that performed all of its management functions in Ohio during
World War H, on a totally unrelated claim, because of systematic and continuous contacts
with the state). But see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(holding that regular and substantial purchasing activity in the forum is insufficient to
support "doing business" jurisdiction). The Court has not provided further guidance
beyond Perkins and Helicopterosregarding the quantity and quality of contacts sufficient
for "doing business" jurisdiction. See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 7, § 2-5 at 142.
11. The Convention is only pertinent in cases involving one or more non-U.S. parties.
The Convention's prohibitions "shall apply in the courts of a Contracting State unless all
the parties are habitually resident in that State." See Convention Draft, supra note 2, art.
2, §1, with a few exceptions not applicable here.
12- See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
ACTIONS
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properly construed limits, deriving from the principles of federalism
and the Tenth Amendment,13 on the enumerated power of Congress.
To reach these issues, section I briefly discusses the Hague
Convention, its values, and why the proscription of these bases of
jurisdiction is integral to its existence. Section II illustrates the
significant role states play in the assertion of personal jurisdiction in
their courts. Section III addresses the commerce power as a possible
constitutional support for proscribing certain bases of state-court
jurisdiction under the Hague Convention. 4 Section IV discusses the
treaty power as another support of the Hague Convention. Both
sections III and IV conclude that the legislation to implement the
Hague Convention is likely to be held unconstitutional due to the
Court's recent interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and the
principles of federalism. The note ends with the recommendation
that the only constitutional and practical means to this end is to allow
individual states to enact legislation similar to the provisions of the
proposed Hague Convention, discarding these bases of jurisdiction.
I. Road to the Hague Convention
Although the Hague Convention primarily concerns the
recognition and enforcement of judgments, these acts are premised
on the agreeable exertions of jurisdiction by signatory states. At the
root of the Hague Convention is the acknowledgment of the wildly
varying ways nations assume jurisdiction in litigation against domestic
and foreign defendants. The simplest and most general explanation
for these jurisdictional differences is the common law-civil law
dichotomy. The civil law tradition practices the Roman idea of
jurisdictional restraint in the spirit of fairness while the U.S. common
law tradition roots jurisdiction in the inherent territorial power of the
sovereign the "power theory."15
Each tradition recognizes
different bases of jurisdiction that often seem excessive by the other.
For example, while France, a civil law country, criticizes U.S.
transient jurisdiction as exorbitant, its authorization of jurisdiction

13. U.S. CONST.amend. X. ("The power not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or

to the people.").
14. Subsequently, the term Hague Convention will be used to specifically refer to
only the proscription of existing U.S. bases of jurisdiction: transient and "doing business,"
as opposed to the entire Hague Convention itself.
15. See generally RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 379-80, 40506,413-34 (6th ed. 1998) (illustrating the difference between civil and common law).
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based purely on the nationality of the plaintiff .attracts the same

criticism from the United States. 16 The acceptance of certain bases of
jurisdiction by one country and not another gives rise to potential
forum shopping, which creates a sense of fear and hostility in the
domiciliaries and courts of the other country.
European countries of both legal traditions solved this problem
by adopting the Brussels Convention in 1968."7 The Brussels
Convention retains the fairness principle of the civilian jurisdiction
tradition 8 while requiring member states to give up their own
exorbitant forms of jurisdiction, but, alas only in regard to litigation
against domiciliaries of other member states. 9 For example, upon
becoming a signatory, England abandoned transient jurisdiction and
France discarded jurisdiction based on the plaintiff's French
nationality?2
To date, the United States is not a party to any bilateral or
multilateral treaty governing the recognition and enforcement of civil
and commercial judgments.2 ' Thus, the United States initiated the
negotiation of the Hague Convention, seeking to create a more
consistent recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in foreign
countries through the adoption of an internationally uniform and
coherent agreement governing the assertion of jurisdiction.2 To be a
signatory of the Hague Convention the United States would also have
16. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 89, 92 (1999). Professor Clermont characterizes jurisdiction based on
nationality as the result from the fact that without the restraints of the power theory, civil
law systems have "succumbed even more blatantly to parochial impulses." Id. However,
even under the U.S. approach, there is a strong interest, at least at the reasonableness
stage, in allowing jurisdiction if the plaintiff is a citizen of the forum.
17. See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention], reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990). England represents the
common law tradition.
18. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, supra note 17, art. 2 (defendant's domicile as the
foundational idea), reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1418; art. 5 (long-arm-like
jurisdiction for tort and contracts actions), 29 I.L.M. 1419; art. 16 (exclusive local
jurisdiction in actions concerning real property), 29 I.L.M. 1422; art. 13-15 (allowing
certain disadvantaged plaintiffs to sue at home), 29 I.L.M. 1421-22; art. 17 (authorizing
forum selection clauses), 29 I.L.M. 1422.
19. See id. art. 3,4, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. at 1418-19.
20. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 93.
21. The United States is not a member of the following Conventions on jurisdiction
and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments: the Brussels Convention (1968), the
Lugano Convention (1972), or the Inter-America Convention (1984). See Fastiff, supra
note 5, at 470 n.2.
22. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 89.
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to discard transience and "doing business" as grounds for exercising
jurisdiction. Eliminating these bases of jurisdiction is the key to
attract other countries to become signatories to the Hague
Convention, especially the Brussels Convention countries that have
no real incentives to join otherwise.'
While they are controversial, these bases of jurisdiction have
substantial historical and constitutional foundations in this country.
There is a history of judicial approval for transient jurisdiction, which
was recently held to be constitutional in Bumham.2 The Court also
noted, "[w]e do not know of a single state or federal statute, or a
single judicial decision resting upon state law, that has abandoned instate service as a basis for jurisdiction."'
However, the use of
transient jurisdiction meets criticisms at home and abroad."' Once the
most important basis of U.S. jurisdiction against defendants outside
the states' territorial limits,27 today jurisdiction based solely on service
of process within the forum is rarely used, and when used against
foreign defendants, the ensuing judgments face the prospect of the
lack of recognition and enforcement abroad.' It has been suggested
23. The Hague Convention could put these bases of jurisdiction on a "gray" list (in
the format of a mixed convention along with the accepted "white" list and prohibited
"black" list) where ensuing judgments are recognized and enforced at the discretion of the
enforcing forum. Again this would not be much of a change from the current system and
might not be enticing to the European countries.
24. 495 U.S. 604. "The short matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence
alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system that define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' Id. at 619.
25. Id. at 615.
26. See, e.g., The Future of Personal Jurisdiction: A Symposium on Burnham v.
Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 559 (1991). See also Joachim Zekoll, "Could a Treaty
Trump Supreme CourtJurisdictionalDoctrine?": The Role and Status of American Law in
the Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1296-97 (1998)
(explaining that transient jurisdiction conflicts with international standards). The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, section 421,
Reporters' Note 4 (1987) stated, "Jurisdiction based on service of process on one only
transitorily present in a state is no longer acceptable under international law if that is the
only basis for jurisdiction and the action in question is unrelated to that state.27. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or
Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111, n.38 (1999) ("[T]ag
jurisdiction... [is]...
best understood historically by considering the important role that it
once played in mitigating the rigors of a territorial system highly protective of defendants
when travel was difficult and expensive, and thus serving the interests of plaintiffs and
states.").
28. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 112, citing DAVID EPSTEIN & JEFFREY L.
SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION § 6.04[3] (2d ed. 1994); LOUIS ELLEN TEITZ,
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION § 1-6, at 50-52 (1996).
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that transient jurisdiction should only be used when all other
appropriate bases of jurisdiction are not available.29 Similarly, the
peculiarly U.S. doctrine of "doing business" jurisdiction finds support
from the Court's opinion in Perkins.'° Since then, however, courts
typically resort to it only when no other appropriate bases of personal
jurisdiction reach the defendant.3' Generally, the Court has left states
the discretion to exercise "doing business" jurisdiction,32 and a
number of states have enacted "doing business" statutes that remain
important bases of jurisdiction today.3
In relinquishing transience and "doing business" as grounds for
jurisdiction, the United States would reap the Hague Convention's
purported benefits. The beneficiaries of the Hague Convention
would be U.S. litigants in civil or commercial actions involving foreign
parties. Without such a Convention, U.S. plaintiffs risk having U.S.
judgments unrecognized and unenforced in Brussels Convention
countries. Likewise, as defendants in actions involving plaintiffs from
Brussels Convention member states, U.S. parties are still subjected to
the pre-Brussels Convention exorbitant bases of jurisdiction of those
states.' The Hague Convention would bring the United States into
parity with European Union countries in terms of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. Furthermore, other non-Brussels
Convention countries could become signatories to the Hague
Convention to avoid being subjected to disfavored U.S. and
European forms of jurisdiction. By expanding the regional standard
of the Brussels Convention to an international level, the Hague
Convention might promote more unfettered international commerce.
With the purported benefits of the Hague Convention apparent,
the question shifts from "should the United States become a
member" to "could the United States become a member." In

29. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 112. Professor Clermont also suggested that
perhaps the U.S. should insist on a new provision for jurisdiction against terrorists and
human rights violators, against whom the human rights community has relied on transient
jurisdiction. See id.
30. 342 U.S. 437.
31. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851,854 (N.Y. 1967).
32. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.10, at 125 (3d ed.
1999).
33. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7303 (1999); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1301(b)
(McKinney 2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4122(a) (2000).
34. See Brussels Convention, supra note 17, art. 3 & 4. Some of these foreign
judgments, however, may not be enforced in the United States for being based on
exorbitant forms of jurisdiction.

152

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28:145

answering the latter question, it is instructive to first examine the role
states play in the exercise of personal jurisdiction in their courts.
Against that background, this note will explore possible constitutional
authorization in the Commerce and Treaty Clauses for Congress to
abrogate this state function.

H. States' Role in the Exercise of Jurisdiction
State legislatures and judiciaries play an active part in the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in state courts. A state court can
only exercise jurisdiction over a party or a piece of property when it
has both statutory and constitutional authorities.35 The Due Process
Clause36 of the federal constitution sets the outer bounds of a state's
permissible jurisdictional power but does not actually confer any
jurisdiction on state courts.3 1 It is the state's long-arm statute that
grants power to its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction.3S
The use of a long-arm statute by a state to assert jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant was first upheld by the Court in Hess v.
Pawloski.3 ' Later, state legislatures began enacting comprehensive
jurisdictional statutes based on the defendant's conduct in the state
after InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington4 validated the expansion
of state court jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." These
long-arm statutes come in two general varieties: "enumerated act"
statutes and "to the limits of due process" statutes.42 An "enumerated
act" long-arm statute bases jurisdiction over nonresidents on a variety
of contacts with the forum.43 An example is Illinois' long-arm statute:
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this
State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an
individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from
the doing of any of such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
35. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.1 at 96.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
37. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.1 at 96.
38. See id.
39. 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding the validity of a nonresident motorist statute).
40. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.12 at 141-42.
42. See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 7, § 4-1 at 381-82.
43. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.12 at 142.
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(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;

(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this State;
44

Alternatively, a "to the limits of due process" long-arm statute is
drafted so that it can expand or contract with the state and federal
Supreme Courts' interpretation of due process. 5 California has such
a long-arm statute:
A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.6
Since 1963, every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has
either by statute or court rule extended jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants and corporations in cases where it would be
constitutionally permissible." Today, almost twenty states have longarm statutes that allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the
maximum extent permitted by the Constitution.' Another twentyfive have statutes that have been interpreted, in whole or in part, to
reach the limits of the Constitution.
The legislative rationale of the long-arm statute is to provide a
convenient local forum for state citizens to litigate claims that arise
from the activities of nonresidents in the state. 0 This is a valid
exercise of the state's police power so long as it comports with due
process requirements. The recognition of a state's supremacy in
enacting its long-arm statute is further evident in the determination of
whether a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.
Besides comporting with federal constitutional due process standards,
a federal court must also find statutory authority for the exercise of
jurisdiction under the laws of the state in which it sits'
44. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2000).
45. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.12 at 143.
46. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2001).
47. See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 7, § 4-1 at 381.
48. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.12 at 144. For a compilation of the longarm statutes of all 50 states and the District of Columbia, see CASAD & RICHMAN, supra
note 7, app. E at 389-487.
49. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 32, § 3.12 at 144.

50. See id. at 143.
51. In Hess, at the state level, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the
long-arm statute to be a valid exercise of the police power. 274 U.S. at 354-55. The U.S.
Supreme Court did not discuss the police power in holding that the same statute comports
with the due process standards.
52. See Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Authority, 745 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
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The prevalence of state long-arm statutes illustrates the
important role states play in assessing whether personal jurisdiction is
proper in their courts. More importantly, because a majority of states
have long-arm statutes that reach the limits of the Constitution it
follows that there are only two appropriate ways to proscribe
transient and "doing business" jurisdiction. The Court could either
find these bases of jurisdiction unconstitutional or states could
eliminate them statutorily. After Burnham and Perkins, the
constitutionality of transient and "doing business" jurisdiction,
respectively, is no longer in doubt. Thus, there remains but one
option: states' discretionary power to extend or withhold these bases
of jurisdiction.
HI. Commerce Power
One constitutional support for congressional enabling legislation
pursuant to the Hague Convention comes from the commerce
power." Under its Article I power, Congress can regulate single state
activities so long as those activities have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.' 4 The level of deference the Court will give to
Congress in determining whether a regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce depends on whether the activity is
There is a presumption of
"commercial" in character.55
constitutionality for federal regulations of single state commercial
activities if "there is any rational basis on which Congress could have
the activities have a substantial effect on interstate
concluded that
56
commerce."

In implementing the Hague Convention, the "activity" that
Congress seeks to regulate is the jurisdiction of state courts in cases
involving at least one foreign party. It is certainly possible to make
the argument that the acceptance of transient and "doing business"
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
3 ("The Congress shall have the Power... To regulate
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."). Once, it was argued that congressional power to regulate foreign commerce
exceeds the power to regulate interstate commerce because the latter is done at the
expense of the reserved power of the states. See LOuiS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 356 n.9 (1996). However, it is now generally
accepted that Congress' power is the same in relation to both. See id.
54. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.9, at 459 (3d ed. 1999).

55. See id.
56. Id.
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jurisdiction by U.S. courts may affect the decision of foreign
commercial entities in conducting business with U.S. individuals and
entities or within the United States. Viewing these bases as
exorbitant and arbitrary, foreign participants may be reluctant to
become involved in the stream of commerce of the United States lest
they be hailed into a U.S. court unexpectedly or unfairly. At the very
least, there is enough nexus between the potential application of
these bases of jurisdiction and possible hindrance of interstate
commerce to qualify congressional proscription of transient and
"doing business" jurisdiction as "commercial" in character.
Yet, to find that Congress might be able to legislate state-court
jurisdiction under its commerce power is not enough to reach a
definitive conclusion as to the constitutionality of the Hague
Convention and its implementing legislation. By proscribing certain
bases of state-court jurisdiction, Congress might intrude upon an area
of traditional state sovereignty. This potential conflict with the
principles of federalism warrants an examination of the possible
effect on such legislation by the Tenth Amendment, which provides
that "[t]he power not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."'57
A. Tenth Amendment & Commerce Power
The Court's current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is highly
probative of how the constitutional issue of the Hague Convention
may play out. Throughout its history, the Court has been inconsistent
in its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, alternating between two
different approaches: 1) the Tenth Amendment is a reminder that
Congress may only legislate within the scope of its authority under
the Constitution - a truism, and 2) the Tenth Amendment is an
affirmative protection of states' rights and the principles of federalism
that acts as a counterweight against exercise of enumerated powers by
Congress.' The following chronological discussion briefly traces the
status of the Tenth Amendment in recent history and ultimately
shows that the Court now views this amendment as an actual limit on
the federal government and not just a truism.

57. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
58. ERWIN.CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 22223 (1997).
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B. Truism Past
From 1937 until 1992, the Court expressly rejected the view that
the Tenth Amendment is an independent limit on Congress'
legislative power. In United States v. Darby,59 a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Court
declared: "The Tenth Amendment states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered." 60
During this period of time, only one case deviated from the
Darby reading of the Tenth Amendment, NationalLeague of Cities v.
Usery.61 That case involved a challenge to the 1974 amendments to
the same. Fair Labor Standards Act.62 The amendments sought to
govern minimum wages and maximum hours of employees of states
and their political subdivision.63 The appellants argued that Congress
violated an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its commerce
power when it sought to directly regulate the activities of states as
public employers." Writing for the 5-4 majority, then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist noted that "there are limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its
otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce."6'
Congressional application of the minimum wages and maximum
hours provisions to the states violated the Tenth Amendment because
the law operates to "directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. '
These functions are tasks state and local government typically
perform in administering public law and providing public services.67
The one deficiency of National League of Cities was the difficulty in
determining what constituted a traditional government function. This
problem would open the door for a host of inconsistent lower court
attempts at the definition and create opportunities for the Supreme
Court6 to distinguish the holding of National League of Cities in later
cases.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Id. at 124.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
See id. at 838-39.
See id. at 837.
See id. at 841.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 852.

67. See id. at 851.
68. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 229-231.
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Finally, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 9 the Court expressly overruled National League of Cities.
Garcia involved a challenge to the decision of the Wage and Hour
Administration of the Department of Labor that denied a public
mass-transit system (SAMTA) an exemption from the wages and
hours requirement of the Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA)70 Citing
National League of Cities, the District Court found for the SAMTA
holding that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit
system was a traditional governmental function and thus exempted
from the obligations of the FLSA."
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun, who switched his vote to create a 5-4 majority with the
dissenters from National League of Cities, noted that the previous
approach of determining whether a particular government function is
"traditional" or "integral" was unworkable?' He argued for judicial
restraint in enforcing the Tenth Amendment because it "inevitably
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."7' Further, while
acknowledging that states "occupy a special and specific position in
our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position," he argued
that the political system, instead of the judiciary, should be the
protector of state prerogatives.74
The dissenters in Garcia attacked these two arguments. Justice
Powell argued that the Court could define the parameters of the
Tenth Amendment just as it has defined other ambiguous
constitutional provisions.
Justice O'Connor challenged the
majority's second point arguing that the political process would not
adequately protect the interests of state governments 6 Finally, in his
short dissent, Justice Rehnquist predicted that, in time, the minority's
position on the Tenth Amendment would prevail.'
It is also
worthwhile to note that despite being a low point of judicial
69. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id. at 534.
See id. at 530.
See id. at 546-547.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 551.
See id. at 561 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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protection of federalism, even the majority in Garcia acknowledged
that there are "linitation[s] on federal authority inherent in the
delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers"78 and that "the States
unquestionably do 'retain a significant measure of sovereign
authority."7
C. Toward an Affirmative Protection

In 1992, the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence took a
sudden turn in New York v. United States.o There, the Court, by a 6-3
margin, invalidated a federal law for violating the Tenth
Amendment.'
The state challenged provisions of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act that required, among other things,
states to either accept ownership of radioactive waste or to regulate it
according to the instructions of CongressY Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor stated that this so-called "take title provision"
would impermissibly commandeer the state governments by directing
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The law
therefore exceeded the limits on the scope of congressional powers
under Article I and violated the Tenth Amendment.
Justice O'Connor used a "mirror image" analogy to describe the
distribution of power as a continuum, with the power vested in the
federal government ending where the power reserved to the states
begins.' She wrote, "if a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any
reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of
state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily
a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.""
Significantly, the Court clearly rejected Garcia'sconclusion that the
federal judiciary would not use the Tenth Amendment to invalidate
federal laws." The Court also expressly rejected the argument that a
compelling government interest is sufficient to permit a law that

78. See icL at 550.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 549.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
See iL at 149.
See id. at 153.
See id. at 188.
See id. at 156.

85. Id.
86. See id.
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otherwise would violate the Tenth Amendment.8
The Court again recognized the Tenth Amendment as an
affirmative protection of states' rights in Printz v. United States."'
There, by a 5-4 vote, the Court held that a provision of the Federal
Gun Control Act requiring local law enforcement officers to run
background checks on certain categories of gun purchasers was an
unconstitutional commandeering of state executive branches.' 9 The
Court found this to be a violation of the principles of federalism and
the Tenth Amendment.'
Justice Scalia's majority opinion is
supported by three bases, two of which are relevant here. First, there
is no constitutional history to show that Congress has been given
authority to control the activities of state legislatures or executive
officials.9 ' Second, the federal system, as envisioned by the
Constitution, does not give the federal government the power to
control state legislative or executive officers solely for the purpose of
implementing federal law.'
The most recent in this line of cases, Reno v. Condon,' reinforces
the holding of New York and Printz. In Condon, the state of South
Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA), which regulates states' ability to disclose a
driver's personal information without the driver's consent.9' The
Court unanimously held that while New York and Printz enunciated
certain federalism principles that may limit congressional power,
Congress did not violate them in enacting the DPPA." Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "the DPPA does not require the States in their
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens.... Itdoes not
require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or
regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.""

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at 161.
521 U.S. 898 (1997)
See id. at 935.
See id. at 935-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 903-17.
See id. at 921-24.
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
See id. at 143.
See id.
Id. at 151.
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D. Tenth Amendment & the Hague Convention
New York, Printz, and Condon illustrate the Court's willingness
to use the Tenth Amendment and the principles of federalism to limit
congressional power in appropriate situations. Thus, it is likely that
the Court would not hesitate to include the Tenth Amendment in
determining the constitutionality of congressional legislation
proscribing state-court bases of jurisdiction.
The essential holding of New York and Printz is that Congress
cannot make state governments, or their subdivisions or branches,
Under the
instruments for carrying out congressional agendaY
Hague Convention, the proscription of transient and "doing business"
jurisdiction at the state level would require state legislatures to amend
their long-arm statutes.
This act would be tantamount to
commandeering the state governments to carry out congressional
dictates, contrary to the constitutional principles enunciated in New
York and Printz. And unlike Condon, the Hague Convention
requires "the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens," state "[1]egislature[s] to enact any laws or regulations," and
"state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes
regulating private individuals."98 Thus, a conclusion contrary to
Condon is warranted: the Hague Convention runs afoul of federalism
principles enunciated by the Court in New York and Printz.

IV. Treaty Power
The Treaty Clause of the Constitution is another distinct possible
support for the negotiation and ratification of the Hague Convention
and provides the congressional authority to enact legislation in
pursuant to it. Yet, congressional exercise of the treaty power, like
any other federal power, is potentially restricted by the application of
the principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment. Though the
Court has now interpreted the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative
protection of states' rights in commerce clause cases, it has not had a
recent opportunity to do so in a treaty clause case. It is argued here
that the effect is the same. Consequently, while Congress may
regulate the recognition and enforcement of international judgments
under its treaty power, it cannot do so through proscribing existing
state-court bases of jurisdiction.

97. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 54, § 4.10 at 470.
98. Condon, 528 U.S. at 151.
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A. Treaties & the Constitution
The Constitution devoted little text to the treaty power. The
Treaty Clause provides that the President "shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."' Beyond this,
the Constitution "does not expressly impose prohibitions or prescribe
limits on the Treaty Power, nor does it patently imply that there are
any."1" To this end, the language of the Supremacy Clause"' was
once used to support "a myth that treaties are equal in authority to
the Constitution and not subject to its limitations."" ° The relevant
part of the Supremacy Clause reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuancethereof, and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. ..."103 The
purported differences in the way Acts of Congress and treaties are
made had been interpreted as demonstrating that treaties are not
subjected to the constraints of the Constitution.l 4 This view was
premised on the interpretation of "in pursuance" of the Constitution
to mean "consistent with its substantive prohibitions."1 5 Thus,
treaties made "under the authority of the United States" did not have
to comport with the Constitution."l
However, this peculiar choice of words of the Supremacy Clause
The Framers understood "in
has been explained differently.
pursuance" of the Constitution to mean, or also mean, "following its
adoption"; using the phrase for its temporal connotation." The "in
pursuance" language was not used for treaties because the Framers
wished to have treaties made before, as well as after, the adoption of
the Constitution (treaties that were then being resisted in some
States) to continue to be the law of the land and binding on the
States."° Subsequently, the issue of where treaties stand in relation to

99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
100. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 185.
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cI. 2.
102. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 185.
2 (emphasis added).
103. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl.
104. See HENKIN, supra note 53, at 186.
105. See id. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,180 (1803).
106. See HENKIN, supra note 53, at 186.
107. See iL
108. See id., citing 2 Farrand (n.11 to Ch. I) 417 (noting the use of "which shall be
made" for Laws of the United States and "made, or which shall be made" for treaties).
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the Constitution was resolved by Justice Black's plurality opinion in
Reid v. Covert.' He stated that "no agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. ' .. °
Henceforth, treaties are subjected to the confines of the supreme law
of the land - the Constitution."'
While it is now accepted that the treaty power is subject to the

confines of the Constitution, it is unclear how the current Court
would decide a challenge to a treaty based on the theory that it
violates the Tenth Amendment. The sole Supreme Court precedent
on this issue is the 80-year old Missouri v. Holland, where the Court
rejected the claim that state sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment
limit the scope of the treaty power."' However, after New York and

Printz, there is a clear indication that the Court is willing to use the
Tenth Amendment to invalidate federal laws that infringe states'
rights. It remains to be seen how this federalism trend will affect
future treaties such as the Hague Convention.
B. Missouri v. Holland

In Holland, the state of Missouri challenged the constitutionality
of a treaty, and the ensuing congressional enabling legislation,
between the U.S. and Great Britain that protected migratory birds."
Missouri asserted that the regulation of migratory birds is within the

109. 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (plurality opinion reversing the conviction of a U.S.
military dependent who was convicted in Britain without a jury trial pursuant to
jurisdiction under a treaty between the U.S. and Great Britain; the Court held that the
federal government cannot, through a treaty, deprive citizens of their Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial). Though Justice Black was only writing for a plurality of four, none of
the other Justices suggested that they disagreed with his view. See HENKIN, supra note 53,
at 459, n.51. See also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (holding that a treaty
cannot cede the territory of a state).
110. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
111. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 54, § 6.5 at 574.
112. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
113. See id. at 430. The way the case developed is of special interest: Congress
originally enacted a statute regulating migratory birds within the states. This statute was
challenged in two separate federal district courts (United States v. McCullagb, 221 F. 288
(D. Kan. 1915) and United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914)) and both struck
down the statute as unconstitutional because its subject matter was beyond the
enumerated powers of Congress. Afterward, in trying to circumvent the courts' rulings,
the federal government negotiated and ratified a treaty with Great Britain (which was
then in charge of the foreign affairs of Canada) for the protection of migratory birds in the
United States and Canada. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug.
16,1916, Can.-U.S., 39 Stat. 1702.
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power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.114 Therefore,
it argued that the legislation was an intrusion on state sovereignty and
that Congress could not accomplish through the treaty power what it
lacked the power to achieve in the absence of the treaty."5
The Court disagreed. It held that the Constitution expressly
grants the federal government the power to make treaties and that
states therefore could not claim that the treaty, or a statute adopted
pursuant to it, violates the Tenth Amendment. 16 Holland confirmed
that Congress has the power to do what is "necessary and proper" to
implement a treaty even if its action was not within any other
Subsequently, the opinion has been
congressional powers. 7
interpreted to insulate the treaty power from federalism-based
attack.1 In the years following Holland, the assumption was that
"there are no significant 'states' rights' limitations on the treaty
power.11 9 This is evident in the fact that no treaty has ever been
struck down by the Supreme Court as an infringement on state
sovereignty."l
C. Missouri v. Holland& the Hague Convention
As it stands, Holland poses an obstacle to a Tenth Amendment
challenge of a treaty. Holland may not, however, carry as much
weight today as it did in the 1920s, when it was decided. There has
been a proliferation of treaties since then, which amplifies the
concerns of misuses of the treaty power without a check on possible
infringement of states' rights.' There is also the renewed significance
of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on the exercise of federal
power. Additionally, Holland may not have much value as a
precedent because the Court has stated that stare decisis carries less
weight with respect to constitutional decisions because Congress
114. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 430.
115. See id. at 432.
116. See id.
117. See HENKIN, supra note 53, at 204.
118. See id. at 190-91.
119. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 345 (1995).
120. See HENKIN, supra note 53, at 185. But see Collello v. United States Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n, 908 F. Supp. 738 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding the freezing of a Swiss bank
account of a U.S. citizen at the request of the Department of Justice pursuant to a treaty
unconstitutional).
121. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390,460 (1998).
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cannot overturn them.'22
Furthermore, the facts of Holland are distinguishable from those
of the Hague Convention. In Holland,Justice Holmes wrote:
The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory
words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is
whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment ....[Here] a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another
power. The subject matter is only transitorily within the State
and has no permanent habitat therein.' 3
First, there is not the same exigency in rendering uniformity in
enforcing foreign judgments as in preventing the extinction of
migratory birds. Holland asserted that the protection of migratory
birds was a matter of the "sharpest exigency for the national well
being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such could."1 " The Court went on to say that without the
treaty and the congressional statute "there soon might be no birds for
any powers to deal with."" Yet, without the Hague Convention,
parties to international disputes face only the same difficulties as they
do today in getting their judgments recognized and enforced. While
the status quo may cause some inconvenience and unfairness, there is
time for the negotiating countries to come up with a treaty that
comports with our understanding of states' rights. International
commerce is in no danger of extinction without the Hague Treaty.
Second, the treaty in Holland concerns migratory birds that by
nature are "only transitorily within the State." '26 Thus, in an implicit
balancing of the necessity of national action and states' rights over a
subject matter that is not permanently connected to the state, the
Court came out in favor of the treaty. However, here the issue of
state-court jurisdiction is not transitory but a permanent and
important matter of state sovereignty - the states derive legitimacy
for their democratic process through their ability construe and
adjudicate their own law.
Lastly, Holland does not stand for the proposition that there are
no limitations on the treaty power in relation to states. 7 It only said
122. See id. at 459, citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,235 (1997).
123. 252 U.S. 416,433-435 (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 433.

125. See id. at 435.
126. See id.
127. See HENKIN, supra note 53, at 193.
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that there were no limitations from any "invisible radiation" of the
Tenth Amendment."
In recent years, however, the Tenth
Amendment has been "radiating" strongly in cases like New York
and Printz. Then, as now, the issue of whether the Tenth
Amendment applies is dependent on the alleged infringement on
states' rights: regulating migratory birds in Holland and proscribing
state-court bases of jurisdiction under the Hague Convention. With
regard to the topic of migratory birds, which due to their nature and
the exigency in preventing their extinction are more properly within
the province of the federal government. Regulating migratory birds
is within the zone of federal authority because the protection of
migratory birds is better done at the national level and the birds'
connection to the individual states is minimal. In contrast, there is an
inextricable connection between state-court jurisdiction and the
states.
States have always had primacy in determining the
jurisdictional extents of their courts, within the boundaries of the
state and federal Constitutions. In the context of this strong
relationship, the "invisible radiation" of the Tenth Amendment
would surely be felt by any congressional attempt at sidestepping this
state right.
For these reasons, Holland should not be the controlling case in
the determination of the constitutionality of congressional legislation
implementing the Hague Convention. Rather, the federalism
principles enunciated in New York and Printz should be guide such
an analysis.
V. Conclusion
The proposed Hague Convention provides the United States
with a guarantee that U.S. judgments in commercial and civil matters
involving at least one foreign party will be recognized and enforced
among the signatory countries. The basis for this consistent and
predictable recognition and enforcement is the requirement that
courts rendering the judgments must have proper jurisdiction over
the parties and the controversies. The Hague Convention provides a
list of accepted and prohibited grounds for the exercise of
jurisdiction. Among the prohibited are transient and "doing
business" bases of jurisdiction. In pursuant to the Hague Convention,
Congress would have to pass implementing legislation proscribing
these prohibited bases of jurisdiction in both federal and state courts.
128. See id.
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Yet, Congress possesses no constitutional authorization to regulate in
this area with respect to the states in spite of its commerce and treaty
powers. Under the current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment
and the principles of federalism, it is likely that any such
implementing legislation would be found unconstitutional.
The alternative is to leave the states to develop their own
jurisdictional law in light of the Hague Convention and under the
guidance of the Constitution. Through the use of long-arm statutes,
states have been in the business of determining the jurisdictional
limits of their courts for a long time. Individual states can balance the
benefits of the Hague Convention and any values in retaining
transience and "doing business" as bases of jurisdiction. If the Hague
Convention is indeed the answer to the woes of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, it might just entice the states to
eliminate these exorbitant forms of jurisdiction from their courts. 29
The United States would then be able to meet all of the obligations of
the Hague Convention and become a signatory.

129. Additionally, Congress can entice the states to dispose of these bases of
jurisdiction by using federal conditional grants. In New York, the Court noted, "[the
Constitution] permits the federal government to hold out incentives to the States as a
means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes." 505 U.S. at 189.

